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I think I don't believe there's a definite answer to whether any particular act is Right or Wrong or Good or Bad. To whom? Based on how much information, in how big a system, over what period of time? To me the indeterminacy isn't because there are many cultures or many people. It's just that it's impossibly complicated. I'm still willing to judge people and actions and try to persuade others to frame and see things as I do, so I place a very high value on some of my opinions and tend to discount other people's. I do try not to be a jerk about it. What kind of metaphysical position is that? Murky-ism perhaps. Your belief in true ethical statements strikes me almost as religious. What's an example? "Killing another person is wrong"? It's not a bad rule of thumb, but I can't by any means call that an absolute. "Always put the cap back on the toothpaste"? What if the house is on fire? "Maximize happiness"? I'm not an all knowing supercomputer, so how the hell do I do that?
MT | Homepage | 05.07.06 - 2:24 am | #

Torturing babies for fun is wrong.
Rob Helpy-Chalk | Homepage | 05.07.06 - 7:55 am | #

and... Pulling the wings off flies for fun is wrong.
Bob Koepp | 05.07.06 - 9:37 am | #

I'm actually not so sure of that one, because I'm skeptical about the moral status of insects & arachnids.

Note that one does not need to actually know large trove of moral truths to believe that they are out there. One of the nice things about rejecting relativism is that it allows you to embrace falliblism. Any one of my moral beliefs might be wrong, although there are some that I am more attached to than others. The same is true of my empirical beliefs.
Rob Helpy-Chalk | Homepage | 05.07.06 - 9:57 am | #

Torturing babies for fun is wrong? What is "torture"? What is "for fun"? Which individual organisms count as "babies"? I can't sign onto a principle I can't understand. I don't mind signing onto rules of thumb, however, and that seems like a winner. How about this: If we could teach them, would there be true and false ethical statements for dogs? Regarding actions and behaviors of which both people and dogs are capable, do these statements differ?
MT | Homepage | 05.07.06 - 2:03 pm | #

I take that back: "Torturing babies for fun is wrong" is not a winner, because it's useless. "Torturing babies for fun" is insane. No sane person could have fun or anticipate fun in torturing a baby. This is back to your ethical sociopath business.
MT | Homepage | 05.07.06 - 2:08 pm | #

(Warning: Horrible thought ahead) Would it be "wrong" for the dog to eat the baby?
MT | Homepage | 05.07.06 - 2:19 pm | #

But how can the belief that, to use your example, sati, is wrong, be as justified and as factually true as our empirically tested "belief" in the speed of light?

I would agree that sati is wrong. As an atheist, I can't write it off as being wrong because it's against God's command. So what is this based on, aside from my vague personal feelings against the needless waste of life? It's certainly not as clear to me as the basis of the speed of light. Are we talking about maximizing human happiness, or am I way off base here?

(I realize this is a big, off-topic question in the vein of "how do we know what is right and wrong", but if you could even point me to an older post or helpful page I'd appreciate that.)
amadaun | 05.07.06 - 2:42 pm | #

Thanks for the long answer -- you've convinced me that I am not a relativist, and that I was (or convinced myself I was) a relativist in about my senior year of H.S./freshman and sophomore years of college. I don't think I ever pulled that "student relativism" line on any of my professors; but I also did not take many classes where it would have been relevant. I do remember using a non-academic version of that line on my parents.

I don't remember making a transition though, from that sort of nihilism to my current confused-but-human consciousness. Certainly I never had a moment of ethical realization, when the scales fell from my eyes and I perceived that yes there is a right and wrong which exists prior to my calling things right and wrong. And even now when I think about why things are called right and wrong, I can't really see any basis for it besides cultural tradition. So I guess put me down as an unreflective not-relativist (what is the antonym?) who if he tried to reason it out would probably end up at relativism, find it absurd, and treat the whole thing as a proof that ethics is not susceptible to reason.
The Modesto Kid | 05.07.06 - 8:34 pm | #

unreflective not-relativist (what is the antonym?

Therein lies a problem in itself. The antonym of relativist is absolutist, which has come to signify the opposite vice. An absolutist thinks not only that there are ethical truths, but that he is in possession of more than a few significant ones, and they are to be applied the same way regardless of context. An absolutist is, at least in my book, a fundamentalist.

The truth lies in a middle way between relativism & nihilism on the one side and dogmatism, absolutism and fundamentalism on the other.
Rob Helpy-Chalk | Homepage | 05.07.06 - 9:50 pm | #

But how can the belief that, to use your example, sati, is wrong, be as justified and as factually true as our empirically tested "belief" in the speed of light?

There isn't a short answer to this question. My preferred method of ethical reasoning is a process called reflective equilibrium, which dates back to Aristotle. this power point presentation illustrates the process using the issue of moral status, that is, what things are morally considerable.

There are dozens of theories of ethical reasoning out there, but they all wind up involving some form of reasoning by analogy. (Similarly, there are dozens of theories of scientific reasoning out there, but they all boil down to some form of hypothesis testing.)
Rob Helpy-Chalk | Homepage | 05.07.06 - 9:55 pm | #

I have some issues here...

First, I find that much of your argument seems to be, "relativism can't be true, because if it were true, there would be bad consequences, like we wouldn't be able to talk to each other as easily." We both agree that something having back consequences doesn't make it false, right?

Second, I find that appraiser relativism and agent relativism seem to be mixed together and combined in your post. The combination agent/appraiser relativism takes the form of, roughly, "A is the morally right action for agent x to carry out if x believes that A is morally right."

This is a form of relativism, to be sure. However, it is a rather unique one. There is also simple appraiser relativism, in which an appraiser's moral judgment is not objective, but those judgments do not apply solely to the appraiser-as-agent: they apply to all that the appraiser appraises. An appraiser relativist can condemn FGM among the Massai, because what they're doing is wrong, and it's the right thing to do for her to argue against it, as she can tell through a combination of introspection, moral reasoning, and empirical data collection.

Or there's simple agent relativism: morality is objective, but does not apply to all agents in the same way. For instance, an agent relativist might claim that there is a moral difference between a black person using a certain six-letter word and a white person using it, regardless of the motive, intention, or consequences of the act. However, this needn't be a subjective matter: this could be an objective moral fact.

Only by combining agent and appraiser relativism do you get this, "whatever an agent sincerely believes to be the right course of action is the right course of action for that agent" view.

I know you must get tired of smacking down the errors of people who don't recognize the clear fallaciousness of relativism, but you have to understand that arguments that may be clear to someone who looks at philosophy from a well-educated perspective may take certain things for granted that are far from obvious to someone without such training.

Basically, I want to know the basis for moral objectivism (maybe too big a task for a comment thread reply). I don't think moral statements are meaningless, because it just seems to me that moral statements do have meanings. Basically, if error theory is correct, then I'm completely delusional: I'd grant the possibility, but I don't want to depend on myself being crazy for a metaethical theory to work. Some form of relativism, on the other hand, seems to make sense to me. It makes sense of what I say, and of what other people say. Objectivism, though: I don't understand it. Basically, what sorts of statement is a moral proposition?

Is is just a matter of linguistics? "Murder is wrong" is true because of the meaning of the words "murder," "be," and "wrong?" It's true in the same sense that 2 + 2 = 4 is true then?

Or is it a matter of social science? "Murder is wrong" is an empirical truth about how human society works, just as "in a free market, an increase in supply will lower equilibrium price" is an empirical truth?

Basically, if morality is objective, I want to know where it comes from.
Julian Elson | 05.08.06 - 8:10 pm | #

You said

First, I find that much of your argument seems to be, "relativism can't be true, because if it were true, there would be bad consequences, like we wouldn't be able to talk to each other as easily."

Then you gave the following argument against error theory

I don't think moral statements are meaningless, because it just seems to me that moral statements do have meanings. Basically, if error theory is correct, then I'm completely delusional: I'd grant the possibility, but I don't want to depend on myself being crazy for a metaethical theory to work

I meant my argument against relativism from the possibility of communication to have the same form as your argument against error theory. In each case the theory implies, not something bad, but something false. We know moral statements have meanings* and we know communication on ethical issues is possible. Any metaethics that denies the outcomes is simply not true to the data.

Second, I find that appraiser relativism and agent relativism seem to be mixed together and combined in your post.

I was not thinking about agent relativism at all, and I considered adding a bit where I explain why it isn't an issue, but decided not to bother.

What you are calling agent relativism I don't think of as a sort of relativism at all. (I had not even heard the term agent relativism.) I simply thought of is at the need to apply rules with sensitivity to the details of the situation. Killing is wrong...but we make exceptions for self defense. This, by the way, is no different than the situation with scientific laws. A falling body accelerates at a rate of 9.8 m/s/s...unless you allow for friction...or are too far from the earth's surface.

The form of relativism I was arguing against says that in evaluating other's actions, judge them by their culture or perhaps even by their own ideas. Better yet, don't judge them at all.

I didn't say this was a sophisticated view. I said it was at work in a lot of popular culture. It is at work because people are encouraged (with good reason) not to judge each other. Relativism is a prohibition against judging others that can work for people who do not believe in a God who is supposed to do all the judging.

Is it just a matter of linguistics? … Or is it a matter of social science?

It sounds like you are making the old positivist assumption that all meaningful statements are

ack baby crying
Rob Helpy-Chalk | Homepage | 05.08.06 - 10:48 pm | #

Maybe I should cry too, as I'm feeling ignored. Did I ask a undisentanglably dense question, an offputtingly good question, an irrelevantly and unengagingly boring question, an irredeemably and offensively insinuating question (unintentional), or did I either not seem like I was asking a question or fail to appreciate how comments afterwards were addressing it? Waaaah!
MT | Homepage | 05.08.06 - 11:49 pm | #

I don't think that something being subjective doesn't mean we can argue and communicate about it. If I were to say that The Matrix was a good movie, then that judgment might be in some important ways, subjective, but with good arguments, you could still convince me otherwise ("the characters were completely unbelievable, Keanu Reeves couldn't act worth crap, etc, etc"). In short, I don't think that "my view is subjective" implies "I can't say anything meaningful about my view, nor am I amenable to anything you would tell me."
Julian Elson | 05.09.06 - 2:53 am | #

Sorry MT. I put off your questions because the answers were complicated, and then I forgot about them.

Well the question point is fairly simple.

I take that back: "Torturing babies for fun is wrong" is not a winner, because it's useless. "

Actually its quite usefull: It can be a source of analogies for other things we find wrong and suggests a number of ethical propositions we can generalize.

First of all, it suggests that cruelty in general is wrong. This would be useful in presenting a case against other forms of torture. It also suggests that bad actions can be justified by good outcomes, but that fun is not a good enough outcome. Finally, it suggests that, as I once heard someone put it, "It matters that some people are helpless." Our moral instincts are built partially around protecting the weaker members of our clan, particularly babies. This points to the moral importance of sympathy.

Ok, the dog issue is harder, I'll get to that later today.
Rob Helpy-Chalk | Homepage | 05.09.06 - 8:52 am | #

It's ironic that the example of morality here (not torturing babies) is so closely related to the thing that's preventing Rob from clarifying matters for us (crying baby). It's like, morality itself is what's preventing us from figuring morality out!
Julian Elson | 05.09.06 - 10:04 am | #

MT said: "Torturing babies for fun" is insane. No sane person could have fun or anticipate fun in torturing a baby.

Is every man who rapes a baby not sane? Or are child rapists sane but bad/misguided? In this article about infant rape in South Africa, infant rape seems to derive from a myth that sex with a virgin cures AIDS. This is off the topic, but I just wanted to point out that there are people who are not objectively crazy who essentially torture babies; whether they find it fun or not, I can't say.
Orange | Homepage | 05.14.06 - 4:53 pm | #

Orange,

It is very difficult to tell the difference between being mentally ill and simply being an asshole. Both mental illness and assholery are character traits that we don't want people to have. Indeed, the more I think about it, the more I have trouble separating the categories at all.

In both cases, I think, the proper response involves a combination of coersion and thearapy. We need to help people be better, and if that doesn't work, lock them up.

We generally hope the mentally ill get better for their own sakes: we assume that when someone is mentally ill, it is bad for them. When someone is an asshole, we generally hope they turn themselves around for the sake of the people around them. But I agree with plato that it is better to suffer injustice than to be unjust oneself. And on the other side, the mentally ill are a real drag to be around.

Supposedly the difference between mental illness and criminality is that the mentally ill are not responsible for their behavior and the criminal are. But if the response to them is the same, and our motivation for the response is the same, what does it matter?
Rob Helpy-Chalk | Homepage | 05.14.06 - 11:28 pm | #

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